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CASE BRIEFS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Random Drug Testing Program for Select State Civil Service
Employees Upheld as Constitutional
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's
judgment that a random drug testing program for select civil service
employees did not violate the Fourth Amendment.' The court held
testing urine for drugs was a reasonable search.2 In making that
determination, it balanced individual privacy interests against
governmental interests.3 It confirmed that the state's "special needs,"
based on public safety concerns, outweighed individual privacy rights.
In determining that the state established a sufficient special
need, the court reviewed jurisprudence on governmental interests., It
considered the context in which the employees were subject to testing.6
There was no need for a particularized or pervasive drug abuse problem
among employees.' The positions of the employees were such that, if
they used drugs or were under the influence of drugs while on duty,
they could cause harm to themselves or others. 8 Therefore, the court
determined the State had a "special need" based on substantial public
safety concerns.'
Next, the court established that the employees affected by this
program worked in highly regulated fields.'0 Jurisprudence established
that individuals working in a heavily regulated industry or activity,
such as health care or inside a prison, have a diminished expectation of
'Int'l Union v. Winters, 385 F.3d 1003 (6th Cir. 2004). The select employees
included those: (1) having law enforcement duties; (2) who directed and had
unsupervised contact with prisoners or; (3) with a responsibility to deliver health care
or psychological
services to those in state custody. Id at 1012.
21id.
'Id. at 1007-1012.
4Id.
at 1013.
IInt'l Union, 385 F.3d at 1007-1012.
6

Id.at 1009-1011.

'Id.
8id.at 1012.
9Id.
10Int'l Union, 385

F.3d at 1012.
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privacy." Additionally, the degree of intrusion on this diminished
expectation of privacy was minimal.' 2 The procedure in collecting the
urine allowed the employee complete privacy unless a reason existed to
suspect tampering.'3 The specimen collector stood at a distance and
only listened for normal urination sounds.' 4 The test was random and
continuous, but this had no effect on the intrusiveness of the program."
Therefore, since the violation of individual privacy is minimal, the
special needs of the state outweighed those concerns, thereby making
the drug testing program constitutional. Int'l Union v. Winters, 385
F3d 1003 (6th Ci. 2004).
Florida Statute Unconstitutionally Interferes With the
Government's Separation of Powers When It Attempts to Reverse
a Properly Rendered Final Judgment Regarding Cessation of a
Patient's Life-Prolonging Treatment
The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the circuit court's decision
declaring a Florida statute unconstitutional when it attempted to give
the Governor authority to prevent the withholding of nutrition and
hydration for a patient. '7 This case required the court to decide a
narrow issue regarding a law that violated the fundamental
constitutional concept of separation of powers as it applied to Theresa
Schiavo, a patient who had been in a persistent vegetative state for
fourteen years.18
After suffering a cardiac arrest in 1990, Theresa Schiavo was
rushed to the hospital and has been in a vegetative state since, fed and
hydrated through tubes. '9 Eight years later, Michael, her husband,
petitioned the guardianship court to authorize the termination of these
procedures, despite disagreement by Theresa's parents.20 Due to the
permanency of her condition, the absence of any cure, and the belief
that Theresa would not want to live this way, the Second District
Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision that authorized the

"Id. at 1012.
2 Id.at

1013.

13 Id.

14id.

"16 Int'l
Union, 385 F.3d at 1013.
id
Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004).
18Id.
17

'9 Id.
20 id.

at 324-25.
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cessation of artificial life support. 2' Theresa's parents filed a separate
complaint in the civil division alleging the judgment was no longer
equitable due to evidence of a new treatment that could improve
Theresa's condition.
The court, however, agreed with the
guardianship court, concluding that continuing the life-prolonging
treatment was not what Theresa would want.23 On October 15, 2003,
Theresa's nutrition and hydration tubes were removed. 24
Six days later, the Florida legislature enacted the statute at issue
in this case, which stayed the continued withholding of nutrition and
hydration.2 ' Theresa's tubes were reinserted pursuant to this executive
order. 6 The circuit court granted Michael's action for declaratory
judgment and found the statute unconstitutional on its face and as
applied to Theresa.2 ' The law violated the constitutional separation of
powers, which become the basis of the analysis for this case.28
The first issue addressed by the court was whether the Florida
statute encroached on the power and authority of the judicial branch.2 9
The judiciary has the power to rule on cases, which is subject to review
only by superior courts. 30 A court's decision is final regarding a certain
case or controversy, unless one party wants to appeal to a higher
court.3' The Governor's executive order created a statute that reversed
a final judgment by the court; therefore, it was an unconstitutional
encroachment and interference with the power allocated to the judicial
branch. Even though Theresa's parents were permitted to recall the
prior judgment under a procedural rule, the finality of the court's
decision still stood.33
The second issue addressed by the court was whether the statute
was unconstitutional on its face because it delegated legislative power
to the Governor. 34 A statute violates the nondelegation doctrine if it
fails to provide the executive branch with adequate guidelines or

" Id. at 325.
22 Bush, 885 So. 2d at 327.
23 id.

24Id
25

26
21

21
29

Id.

Id.
Bush, 885 So. 2d at 328.

Id.at 329.
Id.

Id.at 330, citingPlaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 221-22 (1995).
331.
32Bush, 885 So. 2d at 331.
13 Id. at 331-32.
30

31 Id.at

Id.at 332.
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criteria, thereby preventing discretion or favoritism.

35

The Florida

legislature failed to include any standards for the Governor to use when
deciding when and for how long a stay should be issued, thereby
making his independent decision unreviewable.
The court held there
was not appropriate limits to the Governor's power resulting from this
statute and there was also no guarantee that the patient's wishes would
be honored. 37 The court explained the importance of respecting the
integrity and procedural requirements of the United States constitution
and stated very clearly that it refused to improperly delegate powers of
one branch of government to another. 38 The circuit court's final
summary judgment deeming the statute unconstitutional was affirmed.39

Bush v. Schia vo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Pa.2004).
DISABILITY
Additional Testimony From Vocational Experts May Be Necessary
to Determine If Plaintiff Qualifies As a Disabled Individual
Deserving Social Security Benefits
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa,
Central Division, granted defendant commission's motion for remand
pursuant to the Social Security Act ("Act"), where plaintiff sought a
decision from an administrative law judge ("ALJ") for a claim for
supplemental security income and disability insurance.4'
Plaintiff Havill alleged he was disabled due to back, neck, and
arm problems, as well as depression and alcoholism. 4' After his first
applications for disability insurance and social security insurance
benefits were denied in 2001, he requested a hearing.42 The ALJ denied
him benefits because there were jobs in the national economy he could
perform although Havill was unable to perform past work. 43 After
being denied review by the Social Security Administration, plaintiff
filed a timely complaint to the district court seeking judicial review in
2003. 44 Plaintiff agreed to allow review of the ALJ's decision if the
31Id. at

333.
334.
17 Bush, 885 So. 2d
at 336.
36 Id. at

31Id.
39id.
40

at 337.

Havill v. Bamhart, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18721at *1 (D. Iowa 2004).
IId. at *2.

42 Id.

41Id. at
44 Id.

*3.
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court agreed that the there was not substantial evidence to support a
refusal of benefits.
Before analyzing the ALJ's decision, the court deemed it
important to summarize Havill's daily activities and medical history.4 6
Havill was last employed before the hearing doing maintenance on
vehicles, a job he quit due to pains in his chest, back and hips.47 He
claimed to have a crushed vertebra in his neck and kidney pain, which
made it difficult for him to sit or stand for long periods and to walk
long distances.48 Plaintiff said he had alcohol and depression problems
as a result of a stress disorder caused by his experiences with
Vietnam.49 In 2000, Havill was diagnosed with noncardiac chest pain,
most likely a result of heavy smoking and drinking, and he was
hospitalized at a veteran's hospital in 2001 for detoxification and
treatment. 0 Once diagnosed with a mood disorder, plaintiff still did not
take medication given by a psychiatrist.5' Another psychiatrist stated
that Havill's impairments were only supported by medical evidence to
some extent and that
•
his
functional limitations were no enough to
52
qualify him as disabled. After several assessments analyzing Havill's
residual functional capacity, physicians recommended only small
restrictions in physical activity and stated his general strength to be
adequate. 3
The first issue for the court to determine was whether the
vocational testimony offered to the ALJ accurately demonstrated
Havill's residual functional capacity.54 The vocational expert testified
that Havill could not perform any of his previous work and that he did
not have "readily transferable skills," he would be in the sedentary
classification. 55
The AM determined, however, that the expert
testimony showed that plaintiff could perform several unskilled jobs at
a light level and that he was not disabled under the definitions of the
Act 6 In order to determine if an individual has a disability within the
meaning of the Act, there is a five-step evaluation.57 Considered first is
41

Havill,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18721at *4.

46 Id.
47

Id. at *5.

48id.
49 Id.

at *6-7.

'0Havil1, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1872 1at *9.
5 1d at *10.
52 Id.at *15-16.
54

Iid at *17, 22.
Id at *26.

15 Havi1,

2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18721at *24, 26.

Id. at *28.
17 Id. at *29.
56
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the claimant's work activity, and second, is whether there is a severe
impairment limiting the claimant's physical or mental ability to
perform work." The third step looks at the medical severity of the
impairment while the fourth step assesses the claimant's residual
functional capacity ("RFC)") to meet the requirements of past relevant
work.5 9 Finally, if the RFC in step four does not allow claimant to
perform past work, the burden shifts to the defendant Commissioner to
prove that there is other work the claimant can doi 0
The other significant issue addressed by the court was whether
the ALJ used the appropriate legal standard, in other words, whether
the factual findings were supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole. 6' The court reviewed the standard deferentially and
applied a balancing test to analyze any contradictory evidence. 6 ' The
ALJ for this court could only discredit Havill's subjective complaints
of pain if they were inconsistent with the record as a whole. 63 After
carefully reviewing the record, the court found that the AL' s
assessment of credibility and determination of plaintiffs RFC was
supported by substantial evidence in the record.64 However, the court
held it necessary to reverse and remand the case to the Commissioner
due to the AL' s reliance on the vocational expert testimony because
additional testimony was necessary to determine if Havill could
perform jobs consistent with his capabilities assessed by the RFC
determination. Havill v. Bamhant, 2004 US. Dist. LEXIS 18721 (D.
Iowa 2004).

Id at *29-30.
9 Id.at *31.
60 Havill,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1872lat *32.
61Id. at *34.
62 Id. at *36. citing Sobania v. Sec. of Health & Human Serv., 879 F.2d 441, 444
(8th Cir. 1989).
63Id. at

*38.

Id. at *39, 40.
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18721at *40.

65 Havill, 2004
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DISCOVERY
Designation of Treating Physician as an Expert Witness Not
Necessary When Content of Testimony Was Not Learned or
Acquired In Anticipation of Litigation
The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed and remanded the district court's
exclusion of expert testimony of a treating physician and denial of a
motion for new trial in a medical negligence action.66
The plaintiff sued a hospital for injuries she allegedly sustained
in a fall while she was a patient in the hospital. 67 The district court
disallowed testimony from the patient's treating physician because he
was not designated as an expert as required by state code.6 8 After a jury
denied damages, the district court denied the patient's motion for a new
trial.6 9 The court of appeals affirmed.7 °

The issues before the court were (1) whether the district court
abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of a treating physician
on the question of causation; and (2) if so, whether such denial
deprived the patient of a fair trial thereby entitling her to a new trial.7 '
The court held that the exclusion of testimony was
an abuse of its
72
discretion which deprived the patient of a fair trial.
The court noted that disclosure of an expert witness is required
to enable the adverse party to discover his or her mental impressions,
opinions and factual knowledge. 73 However, this information is only
discoverable when it is acquired or developed in anticipation of
litigation.74 The court reasoned that a treating physician's factual
knowledge, mental impressions, and opinions regarding causation of a
patient's injury are not developed or acquired in anticipation of
litigation but rather are learned and before he or she is retained as an
expert witness and before the parties themselves anticipate litigation.75
However, the court mentioned that in some cases the opinions as to
causation of a negligence injury may not be formed during treatment
but in this particular case the patient had sought the physician's
6Hansen v. Central Iowa Hosp. Corp., 686 N.W.2d 476 (Iowa 2004).
Id at 477.
68id
67

69Id
70 id.

71 Hansen, 686

72

Id. at 485.

71Id

at 481.
74Id.
75
Id. at 481.

N.W.2d at 479.
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medical services on multiple occasions for her fall and thus the
physicians had formed an opinion on causation as a "treater." 76 Thus, it
was not necessary for the patient to designate the physician as an expert
witness since his mental impressions and opinions were not within the
reach of discovery for the adverse party anyway. 77
The court also reasoned that since the exclusion of this
testimony materially affected the patient's rights since this was the only
medical testimony on the issue and the jury found that the hospital's
negligence was not the proximate cause of the injuries, the
• 78district court
abused its discretion in denying a motion for new trial. Hansen v.
CentralIowa Hosp. Corp., 686N. W.2d 476 (6Iowa 2004).
Lower Court Engaged In an Abuse of Discretion When It
Compelled Production of Complete Mental Records File Without
Protecting Documents Covered By the Psychotherapy Privilege Or
Balancing Privacy Interests
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
vacated and remanded the district court's order that the mental
retardation records of a mentally retarded adult male, who was a ward
of the District of Columbia Mental Retardation and Developmental
Disabilities Administration (MRDDA), be made available for review to
the counsel of two other mentally retarded men he allegedly sexually
assaulted.79

Appellant and the two appellees, also wards of MRDDA,
resided in the same group home starting in 1997.80 Appellant allegedly
sexually assaulted the appellees in the group home.8' Appellees further
allege that the resident director did nothing to protect them from the
appellant until it moved appellant to another home in 1998." Appellees
sued the District of Columbia for violating their civil rights and for
negligence." During pre-trial proceedings, the district court granted
appellee's motion to compel production of the District of Columbia's
complete files on the appellant. 84
76

Hansen, 686 N.W.2d at 484.

77 i'd

" Id. at 485.
79 In Re: Sealed Case (Medical Records), 381 F.3d
1205 (2004).
80Id. at 1207.
81Id
82

Id.

83 Id.

84In Re: Sealed Case, 381

F.3d at 1208.
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The issue before the court was whether the district court abused
its discretion in granting the discovery order.85 The court held that in
light of the psychotherapy privilege and other privacy concerns, the
district court abused its discretion in granting the motion.86
The Court based its decision on a ruling by the United States
Supreme Court, which states that confidences between a
psychotherapist and her patient in the course of diagnosis or treatment
are protected from compelled disclosure, regardless of the interest in
justice." Further the court reasoned that even then the psychotherapy
privilege is not available the court should allow as much relevant
information to be discoverable as possible while at the same time
preventing unnecessary intrusions into privacy interests. " Because the
district court required the District of Columbia to produce all of the
appellant's "mental retardation records" to counsel for the appellees
without protecting any records that were subject to the psychotherapy
privilege and without weighing appellant's privacy interests against the
appellees evidentiary need for the records, the court held that an abuse
of discretion was committed.89 In Re: Sealed Case (MedicalRecords),
381 F.3d 1205 (2004).
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS
Physicians' Class Action Claim Against Health Maintenance
Organizations for Federal Claims Certified
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Southern
District of Florida's granting of class certification for all Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) related claims and
California Subclass for a physician class action suit against Health
Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs") for systematic underpayment of
reimbursements for procedures.go While the court affirmed the granting
of class certification for all federal RICO conspiracy claims, the court
urged the district court to reconsider the scope of the class on remand. 9'
The court reversed the grant of certification for all state law claims. 92

" Id. at 1211.
86Id. at
87Id. at

88Id.

1218.
1213.

89In Re:
90Klay

91Id.
92 id

Sealed Case, 381 F.3d at 1218.
v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004).

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 8.1:329

Numerous physicians brought suit against HMOs, in which they
serviced either on a fee-for-service plan or a capitation plan93 . The
physicians claimed the HMOs were conspiring together to underpay
physicians by denying reimbursement for procedures they thought were
too expensive, paying less than the procedures were worth by
downcoding, grouping procedures together to reimburse a lesser fee,
ignoring items that drove up reimbursement, holding the claims for
reimbursement for longer than necessary, and failing to pay HMO
physicians for registered patients they had not yet seen. 94 The Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on the Southern District of Florida
consolidated the cases because the suits involved similar questions of
facts. 95 After consolidation, the physicians filed an amended complaint
asking the court to certify three classes.96 The first class was a Global

class, which included physicians providing services to persons insured
by any HMO from August 14, 1990 to the date of certification to
pursue a claim that the HMOs conspired together to violate RICO. 97
The second class was a National Subclass, which included all
physicians providing services to any patient insured by an HMO to
pursue the state law claims of breach of contract, unjust enrichment,
and violation of prompt-pay statutes.98 The third class was a California
Subclass, which included any physician who provided services to any
person insured by the HMOs in California.99
The first issue the court addressed was whether the Global class
action could be certified.'0° In order for a class to be certifiable, under
the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(3), the court must find the
questions of law and fact were common to the members overall.' O' The
court held the Global class was certifiable because of the existence of
common questions of fact and law predominating due to the HMOs
conspiring with joint efforts as a Managed Care Entity to restrain trade
through medical necessity requirements, use of actuarial guidelines,
and use of automated claims systems and software to adjust procedure
codes and reimbursement rates. 10 2 Because all of the HMOs were
national and allegedly conspired to underpay doctors throughout the
1247.
1247-49.
9 Klay, 382 F.3d at 1249.
96Id.at 1250.
9' Id. at
94Id. at

97 Id

98Id.
99 Id

'00Klay, 382 F.3d at 1252.
"°1Id.at 1251.
102

Id. at 1255.
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nation, the conspiracy issues for a RICO claim were common to all the
physicians. 3 The court followed Kirkpatrick v. Bradford" because the
common issues of fact applicable to the Managed Care Entity, the
group of HMOs in which a conspiracy ensued, was substantial, and the
circumstantial evidence used to show reliance was common to all the
physicians.0 5 Although the court affirmed this class, it noted the
physicians could be split into two categories of classes - one based on
the fee-for-service physicians and the other based on the capitation
contract physicians.
The second issue the court addressed was whether the National
subclass was certifiable. ' 7 The court held all three state claims the
physicians were arguing under this class, the breach of contract claim,
the unjust enrichment claim, and the prompt-pay statute claim, were
inappropriate because the claims were too individualized. 8 As such,
this class could not be certified, and the court reversed the district
court's certification of the National subclass.' °9 The court did not
address the issue of certification of the California subclass because the
HMOs did not challenge it on appeal. " 0°
The third issue the court addressed was whether the certification
of a class action of the Global class would be superior to other methods
of litigation."' The court held the district court was correct in choosing
to handle this claim as a class action because of the commonalities
between the physicians' claims, no physicians pursuing the same RICO
claims separately, the time, effort, and expense was more desirable, and
it was manageable and would unclog the federal courts with numerous
individual claims."' T he court further found the trial at issue was not
about the managed care industry, but was about several large HMOs
deviating from their agreements by conspiring to underpay
physicians." 3
Thus, certification of a class action was correct
regardless of whether
one party would be disadvantaged by it because
this is inevitable." 4 Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir.

2004).
'0oId. at

1256.
827 F. 2d 718 (11th Cir. 1987).
'oiKlay, 382 F.3d at 1258.
Id. at 1260-61.
07Id.at 1260-68.
108
Id.
104

10 Id.
110

Klay, 382 F.3d at 1268.

..Id.at 1269-72.
112 id.
13
114

Id. at 1274.
Id.at 1276.
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IMMUNITY
Immunity Doctrine Not Applicable to Public Employee When the
Public Employer "Directs and Controls the Physician's Treatment
of the Patient"
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts at Worcester held that there is a
genuine question of fact as to whether University of Massachusetts
Medical Center, a public employer, directed and controlled the
defendant physician Dr. Bonnie Weiner's ("Weiner") treatment of the
patient ("Nicholopoulos"). 1 5 The Court vacated its previous order
granting summary judgment
and then denied defendant's motion for
16
1
judgment.
summary
Nicholopoulos filed a negligence claim against Weiner, alleging
that Weiner negligently prescribed medication ("Zocor") to lower his
cholesterol levels at a time when he had hepatitis C, Nicholopoulos
developed cirrhosis of the liver and required a liver transplant as a
result of Weiner failing to order blood tests first to check for
hepatitis." 7
Weiner filed a motion for summary judgment on grounds that
she has immunity from liability as a public employee under the
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.18 Weiner's motion for summary
judgment was granted and Nicholopoulos filed a notice of appeal. "9
The central issue that the court faced in deciding whether the
immunity doctrine was to apply was "whether the public employer
directs and controls the physician's treatment of the patient."'20
Dr. Gore, Weiner's Department Chief, affidavit states in part
that Weiner was required to act in accordance with the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Trustees of the University of
Massachusetts and that while she "generally exercised independent
judgment in her treatment of patients, that judgment was always subject
to the right of ultimate control by the University of Massachusetts
Medical
The court, found
viewing
facts
the light
most
favorable Center."'
to the Nicholopoulos,
thatthe
there
is aingenuine
question

15

Nicholopoulos v. Weiner, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 311 at *1 (Mass. Super.

Ct. 2004).
116

Id. at *4.

...
Id. at *1.
..Id at *1.
119 Id.

20 Nicholopoulos, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 311 at *3 quoting Johnson v.
Cooke, 17 Mass. L. Rptr. 517 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2004).
2' Nicholopoulos, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 311 at *2-3.
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of fact about whether Weiner was under the direction or supervision of
his public employer in prescribing Zocor to Nicholopoulos which is at
the core of Nicholopoulos's negligence claim.122 The Court vacated its
earlier order granting Weiner's motion for summary judgment and
subsequently denied Weiner's motion for summary judgment.
Nicholopoulos v. Weiner, 18 Mass. L. Rep. 225 (Mass. Super.
Ct.,2004).
LICENSE TO PRACTICE
Allegations of Sexual Misconduct Based Exclusively On Hearsay
Not Found to Meet the "Substantial Evidence" Requirement
Needed to Revoke a Licensed Professional Counselor
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed an order revoking
Petitioner Dr. John W. Compton's ("Compton") license to practice
psychology and subsequently remanded to the District Columbia Board
of Psychology (Board) for further proceedings.' 2' The court held
deposition evidence based exclusively on hearsay did not constitute
"substantial evidence" required to revoke a Board of Psychology
license. 114
Dr. Compton, who had been practicing psychology since 1969,
formed a joint practice with Dr. Doree Waldbaum Lynn ("Lynn") in
1981. 25' In 1986, Dr. Compton began treating a licensed professional
counselor Fatemeh Mina Klein ("Klein"). 26 Klein, who was pleased
with the individual mental health services, commenced couple group
therapy with her husband, which was co-led by Drs. Compton and
Lynn.'27 Klein's husband began a course of individual treatment with
Dr. Lynn.' 28 Klein was also mentored by the Drs. Compton and Lynn
in the management of Klein's own professional practice. 1
Klein's
individual therapy with Dr. Compton concluded in 1993 and the couple
group therapy and professional mentoring continued until 1995, when
the professional relationship between the Drs. Compton and Lynn
29

Id. at *4.

12

'23
Compton v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Psychology, 858 A.2d 470, 471 (D.C.
2004).

Id. at 476.

214

'25Id. at 471.
126 id.
127 Id.

2. Compton, 858
129 Id

A.2d at 471.
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dissolved. 3 ° Thereafter, Klein had disclosed the sexual relationship
with at least three other psychologists, one of them Dr. Lynn, while
being treated. 3'
In 1997, Klein filed a civil suit complaint against Dr. Compton,
alleging sexual misconduct constituting medical malpractice.3 2 Two
psychologists who treated Klein then filed a joint complaint with the
Board alleging Dr. Compton with sexual harassment of a patient. "3
The Board held a preliminary hearing holding portions of Klein's
deposition testimony from the 1997 civil suit should be allowed into
evidence and held that Dr. Compton violated the standards of
acceptable conduct; the Board adopted the ALJ's recommendation to
revoke Dr. Compton's license to practice psychology. '
The issue before the court was whether the Board made its
decision to revoke Dr. Compton's license from "substantial evidence"
flowing rationally from record facts.'35 The court concluded that "the
disputed hearsay evidence . . . was so central to the allegations of

professional misconduct that, without more corroboration than was
present here, the Board could not substantially rely on3'1 6the deposition to
support its decision to revoke Dr. Compton's license.'
The District of Columbia Appellate Court held that under the
facts that Klein's unavailability to testify and Dr. Compton's denial of
Klein's allegations, "the hearsay deposition in this case did not
constitute evidence sufficiently substantial to support the revocation of
Dr. Compton's license to practice psychology."' 37 The court reversed
the revocation order and remanded the case for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.'! Compton v. D.C. Bd. of Psychology,
858 A.2d 470 (D.C. 2004).
Dentist's Use of "M.D." Designation After Attending Eight-Week
Program At Foreign University Properly Regulated By the State
The Court of Appeals of Kansas ruled that the Johnson District Court
(trial court) erred in denying the injunction sought by the State Board
of Healing Arts (Board) against Steven Thomas, a licensed dentist,
from attaching to this name the designation "M.D." and accordingly
130 Id.

'3 Id.
12

at 471-72.

Id. at 472.

,33Compton, 858 A.2d at 472.
Id at 472, 475.
Id. at 475.
136

37

1

Compton, 858 A.2d at 471.

Id. at 482.
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reversed and remanded to the trial court for an injunction."' However,

the Court of Appeals also found that the statutory scheme regulating
the use of the "M.D." designation was nonetheless overbroad and ruled
that the Board may constitutionally ban only the uses of the "M.D."
designation that may potentially mislead the public, patients, hospitals,
or other health care practitioners regarding the user's licensed or
unlicensed status. 3 9 Finally, the statutory scheme did not violate his

equal protection rights. '40
Steven Thomas, licensed through the Kansas Dental Board
(Dental Board) to practice dentistry, was authorized to treat and
diagnose diseases of the mouth, prescribe medications for the same and
possessed admitting and treating privileges at a hospital to perform
various surgeries.
Mr. Thomas participated in an eight-week course
and received a Doctor of Medicine degree from a University in the
West Indies but did not seek formal medical licensing.' 42 Nonetheless,
Mr. Thomas utilized the designation "M.D." on hospital documents,
on documents and orders in the care of his patients, his business cards,
on his practice groups' website, as well as sought, and received,
approval from both the Dental Board and the Secretary of State to
include the designation on his respective corporate charters.' 3 The
Board sought an injunction, and when the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Mr. Thomas, the State appealed.'"
The Court of Appeals ruled that the Board had jurisdiction over
Mr. Thomas's activities despite him not being a licensee because the
Board had been delegated the authority to protect the public against the
unqualified practice of medicine including those persons who hold
themselves out to the public as a licensee. 14' Based on the statutory
scheme regulating the use of the designation "M.D." and the stipulated
facts on appeal, the Court of Appeals found that Mr. Thomas was in
violation of a number of statutes for practicing medicine without a
license, holding oneself out to the public as a licensed physician, and
practicing medicine without a license. ' 46

13'

State ex rel. State Bd. of Healing Arts v. Thomas, 33 Kan. App. 2d 73 (Kan.

Ct. App. 2004).
139
Id.at 88-89.
140/i.

,4,
Id.at 75-76.
142Id. at

75-77.

,41
State, 33 Kan. App. 2d at 76-81.
'44Id.
at 77.
141
Id at 77-79.
146 Id at 80 -81.
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Although the statutory scheme provided for injunctive relief,
the trial court, in denying the injunction, determined that there was no
public harm in using the designation "M.D."' 147 Although noting
Kansas precedent has previously required the showing of irreparable
harm by the movant in seeking an injunction, the Court of Appeals
distinguished the facts underlying the precedent and ruled the Board
was excused from such a requirement.14 Instead, the Court of Appeals
adopted a Tenth Circuit substitute standard for irreparable harm which
requires the showing that the defendants are engaged in actions
prohibited by a statute which provides for injunctive relief and ruled
that the Board so demonstrated.' 49 Moreover, the Court of Appeals
reasoned, irreparable harm by Mr. Thomas's actions occurred through
his misleading the public, hospital staff, and by damaging the general
esteem and reputation of the title. 5 ° Finally, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the other requirements for an injunction were satisfied:
(1) an action in law will not provide an adequate remedy due to what
would be continued misleading of the hospital staff and the public, (2)
the harm due to the misleading outweighed the harm to Mr. Thomas,
and (3) the public interest would be served and not harmed.'
Mr. Thomas argued the proposed injunction would violate his
constitutional rights to freedom of speech and equal protection under
the law. 5 2 The Court noted that commercial speech is one area where
the U.S. Constitution affords fewer protections such that the State may
limit commercial speech that is fraudulent or deceptive."' However,
Mr. Thomas argued that his use was not misleading because he, in fact,
earned the degree and does not claim to be a physician. 4 The Court of
Appeals rejected Mr. Thomas's argument, explaining that the public
has come to associate the "M.D." designation with 4 years of graduate
school, clinical training, and a residency program and thus Mr.
Thomas's use of it after an eight-week course was misleading and can
be appropriately restricted.'55 As for Mr. Thomas's non-commercial
uses of the "M.D." designation on hospital and patient medical
records, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Board met its burden of
showing a compelling government interest in regulation due to possible
Id. at 81.

147

State, 33 Kan. App. 2d at 81.
Id.at 82.
15 Id.at 83.
148

149
0
151

Id.

152

Id. at 84-85.

"' State, 33 Kan. App. 2d at 85.
154Id.
15

Id. at 86.
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harm to the patient's health due to unjustifiable reliance in the
designation.'5 6 The Court of Appeals similarly rejected Mr. Thomas
argument that the least restrictive regulation, such as the use of a
disclaimer, would suffice because such regulation would be
administratively impossible to enforce to achieve the same public
protections.'57
However, finding the statutory scheme overbroad
because it prohibited every unlicensed individual's use of the "M.D."
designation, the Court of Appeals judicially limited its application to
those uses that may potentially mislead the public, patients, hospitals,
or other health care practitioners of the user's licensed or unlicensed
status.' 8 Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Thomas's equal
protection claims due to the statute's rational relationship to the
government's legitimate purpose of preventing the misleading use of
the "M.D." designation. 9 State ex rel. State Bd. of Healing Arts v.
Thomas, 33 Kan. App. 2d 73 (Kan. Ct App. 2004).
MALPRACTICE
Malpractice Claim Preempted by Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court
for the Eastern District of New York's holding that malpractice claims
brought by a widow of the deceased were preempted by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). '6° The court based
its holding on the rationale that neither the physician nor the health care
company provided medical care to the deceased. 6 ' The court vacated
its previous decision based on the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila and affirmed the
entirety of the
62
district court's decision of dismissal of the complaint.'
The insured widow originally sued her Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO) in state court alleging breach of contract, bad
faith, misrepresentation and negligence for failing to pay for the6
deceased's tandem double stem cell procedure for multiple myeloma.'
The district court dismissed the widow's complaint, and this court
116Id. at 85 88.
...
Id. at 87.
"' State, 33 Kan. App. 2d at 85.

9Id. at 88-89.
Cicio v. Does, 385 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2004).
161Id. at 158.
'60

162

id

163Id.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 8.1:329

reversed part of the judgment of the medical malpractice claims and
remanded it back to the district court. '64 After the opinion was
published, the Supreme Court decided Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila,and
the court
directed the parties to submit supplemental briefs in light of
65
Aetna. 1

The court based its decision upon Aetna, and the holding from it
that stated "any state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements,
or supplants [ERISA] ...conflicts with the clear congressional intent to
166

make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore pre-empted."'
Thus, the court determined that Aetna "fatally undermine[d]" the prior
reasoning in this case. 167 As such, the court found that the district court
did not err in dismissing the complaint.6 Therefore, the court held that
when neither the physician nor the health care company actually
provides medical care to the patient, a malpractice claim will be
completely preempted by ERISA. 69 Cicio v. Does, 385 F.3d 156 (2d
Cir.2004).
Physician, Medical Malpractice Insurance Company, and Patient's
Health Maintenance Organization Not Liable For Failing to Order
Procedure When Patient Had No Symptoms
The Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of the patient's physician and the physician's insurer from an
alleged medical malpractice claim for the physician not ordering a
mammogram. 7 0 The court reversed the trial court's refusal to dismiss7
the patient's health maintenance organization (HMO) for malpractice. '
The court reversed in part and affirmed in part because the physician
did not breach his standard of care in choosing not to order the
existed between
mammogram and because no employment relationship
72
the patient's HMO, Travelers, and the physician.
The patient saw her gynecologist, who recommended a
mammogram but could not order under the patient's HMO because her
breast exam was normal.

'

The patient then went to her primary care

"6Cicio, 385 F.3d at 156.
165Id.

'66d. at

158. (citing Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004).).

167Id.
168

Id.

19

Cicio, 385 F.3d at 158.
Berthelot v. Stallworth, 884 So. 2d 648 (La. Ct. App. 2004).

170

171Id.
72
'73

Id. at 650 - 654.
Id. at 650.
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physician so that he could order the mammogram, but he would not
order it because she had no objective symptoms and was under forty.174
Three months later, the patient found a lump, which was cancerous."'
The patient then sued the physician and his medical malpractice
insurance for allegedly committing medical malpractice by refusing to
order a mammogram, breaching the standard of care so that her cancer
grew and spread. 176 The patient then filed an amended complaint to17 add
1
her HMO as a party to the suit because the physician was its agent.
The first issue the court addressed was whether the trial court
was correct in finding Travelers liable for the physician's failure to
Travelers appealed the judgment of
order a mammogram. 7 1
the physician was not its agent. 179
because
plaintiff
the
$636,506.00 for
Travelers also asserted the trial court erred on the jury instruction about
Louisiana HMO law requiring a baseline mammogram for any woman
between thirty-five and thirty-nine.'f The court held that the statute
only requires an HMO to pay for a mammogram for a thirty-five year
Since the physician did not
old woman if ordered by a physician.'
order a mammogram, Travelers did not violate the statute. 2 The court
further held that the physician was not an agent of Travelers because it
did not control the medical practice of the physician and did not
proscribe how or when mammograms were ordered or administered. 3
Additionally, the court found the patient had used the physician before
she was covered under Travelers, and she had the choice to change
primary care physicians." 4 As such, the court held because no
employment relationship existed between the physician and Travelers,
Travelers could not be liable for the lack of a mammogram.15
The second issue the court addressed was whether the trial court6
erred in dismissing the physician and his medical malpractice insurer.
The patient appealed the directed verdict because she felt that the
physician breached the standard of care by not ordering a baseline
174

d.

Berthelo]4 884 So. 2d at 650.

171

176Id.

Id. at 651.

177

178Id.

id.
I79

'80oBerthelot,884 So. 2d at 652.
181Id. at
82

652 -53.

1

Id.

183

Id. at 654.

184Id.

185Beithelot, 884
186 Id.

So. 2d at 648.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 8.1:329

mammogram for her when her gynecologist recommended it. ' The
court held the directed verdict in favor of the physician and the insurer
was appropriate because the patient failed to carry her burden of proof

regarding the standard of, care in ordering a baseline mammogram."'
Berthelot v. Stallworth, 884 So. 2d 648 (La. Ct.App. 2004).
NEGLIGENCE

Physician Found Negligent For Not Properly Diagnosing Her
Patient, Although Proximate Causation and Damages Unclear Due
to Evidence Erroneously Not Admitted
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Circuit Court of the City
of Fredericksburg's holding that the physician and her employer were

negligent for not examining Allen after he complained of aches and
numbness from his anti-anxiety medication prescribed by the
physician."8 The court upheld the trial court's decision because the
trial court's refusal to allow the physician to cross-examine Allen about
specifics acts of alleged untruthfulness and to limit the cross
examination of his expert witnesses by the physician was appropriate.
The court did remand the case for a new trial on the issues of proximate
cause and damages because of the trial court's failure to allow the
physician to cross-examine Allen about his wife to show evidence of
other reasons for his suicide attempt.19

Allen met with S the
192 physician and informed her that he had
experiences mild anxiety.
The physician switched him to a different
anti-anxiety medicine than the one he was on."' A few days later,
Allen telephoned the physician to let her know that he was
experiencing numbness and muscle aches. 194 He spoke with a
receptionist who told him he was possibly experiencing side-effects
from the medication and he should decrease the dosage, which he did.'95
He still experienced problems, and again called the physician's office,
once again speaking to the receptionist.'96 Allen then met with the
Id. at 651.

187

88
' Id

at 654.
Gamache v. Allen, 601 S.E.2d 598 (Va. 2004).
'90Id at 602-3
9' Id. at 603.
'9' Id at 599.
89

193 Id
194
95

1

Gamache, 601 S.E.2d at 599.

Id.

196 id.
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physician and related his symptoms to her, but the physician did not
believe that it constituted an emergency. 197 The problems continued,
and he eventually went to the emergency room where he was diagnosed
as having transverse myelitis, an inflammation of the spinal cord.' 98
Allen alleged that he had depression from the spinal
dysfunction, along with the physical problems, resulting from the
physician's negligence.' 9 Allen further alleged the loss of function
caused him to attempt to commit suicide. 200 The jury returned a verdict
in favor of Allen against the physician and her employer in the amount
of $6.5 million, which the trial court reduced to $1.55 million. ' The
physician and her employer appealed, arguing that Allen's wife
allegedly used narcotics and performed acts of self-mutilation on
herself, and his suicide was caused by these acts rather than the
physician's negligence. 02
The court mainly addressed whether the trial court erred in
disallowing the evidence about Allen's wife as a possible reason for his
suicide. 23 The court found that the jury was entitled to consider
evidence, such as this, because it was relevant and may have had some
impact on Allen's attempted suicide. 2° Thus, the trial court "abused its
discretion" in failing to permit the evidence about Allen's wife into the
trial, and the
••205 issues of proximate cause and damages were remanded for
a new trial.
The next issues the court addressed was whether evidence of
Allen's alleged untruthfulness was incorrectly inadmissible at the trial
and whether the trial court erroneously limited the scope of the
physician's cross examination of Allen's witness. 2°6 The court found
that the evidence was based on specific acts, and held that the trial
court correctly refused to allow evidence of Allen's veracity because
evidence about specific acts to attack a plaintiffs veracity does not
follow precedent.0 7 The further found that the cross examination of
Allen's witness by the physician was correctly limited due to the
208
Thus, the
accuracy of the witness's observations on Allen's pain.
20

197 Id.

Id. at 600.
,' Gamache,601 S.E.2d at 600.
'9'

200 Id.

Id.at 600-1.
Id.at 601.
203 Id.at 601-2.
20' Gamache,601 S.E.2d at 601.
20,

202

205 Id.

6Id.at 602.

207 Id.
208

Id.at 602-3.
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court ultimately held the physician and her employer breached the
standard of care owed to Allen and the above alleged errors were not
errors challenging the trial court's finding of negligence."l Gamache v.
Allen, 601 S.E.2d 598 (Va. 2004).
Doctor Did Not Deviate From the Standard of Care When
Plaintiff's Child Was Born With Defects and Doctor Ordered
Several Tests to Rule Out Possible Medical Problems
Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of her minor son, Arkel, appeals
the jury verdict in favor of her defendant physician, which found he did
not commit medical malpractice 1 ° Plaintiff's child suffers from severe
birth defects from exposure to testing administered by defendant
physician.2 ' Plaintiff's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict
denied and the Court of Appeals of Louisiana affirmed that
d ••was
212
decision.

Plaintiff was defendant physician's patient for six years and
defendant had already delivered plaintiffs first child in 1991.213 Due to
plaintiff's complaints of severe abdominal pains, defendant ordered a
pregnancy test, which was negative. 14 Defendant also ordered
ultrasounds,
astdmir ei d one
o discovered
m ni t o
" "215a cyst on her left ovary, and another was
administered to monitor it.
No evidence of pregnancy was found
until the end of April in 1995.216 Plaintiff never discussed her sexual
activity with defendant and at each of her appointments in April of
1995 she signed an acknowledgement stating she was not pregnant and
had no reason to think she was pregnant . 217 Defendant physician
warned plaintiff about the dangers of x-rays to her unborn child once he
discovered she had been exposed to radiation during pregnancy."'
Several other physicians testified as to whether defendant physician's
care for plaintiff patient used the reasonable standard of care.21 9
The only issue presented to the jury was whether defendant
physician should have given plaintiff patient a pregnancy test before
S.E.2d at 603.
Brown v. Stickley, 886 So. 2d 515, 515 (La. Ct. App. 2004).

209Gamache, 601
2'o
211

Id. at 517.

212 Id

3

Id. at 518.

214 Id.

21.
Brown,

886 So. 2d at 518.

216 id.

217Id. at 519,
2. Id at 520.
29 Id. at *15.

20.
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ordering tests that exposed the fetus to radiation. 220 The court looked at
how defendant physician kept documentation and why he ordered
certain testing for plaintiff to determine if the denial of plaintiff's
221
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was in error.
The court held reasonable people and professionals could find
defendant's choice of testing and care did not deviate from the accepted
standard of care.222 Defendant doctor administered tests he felt
appropriate to discover the medical problems from which plaintiff
suffered. 223 The court believed defendant only realized in hindsight that
certain tests were medically unnecessary and as a result, the judgment
in favor of defendant physician was affirmed with costs of the appeal
assessed to plaintiff. 2 Brown v. Stickey, 886 So. 2d515, 515 (La. Ct.
App., 2004).
PATENTS
Patent was Valid and Enforceable Without Clear and Convincing
Evidence of Anticipation, Obviousness and Inequitable Conduct
The District Court for the District of Delaware held Aventis' patent for
riluzole, a chemical compound used in the treatment of amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis (ALS), valid and enforceable and that parts of the
patent were infringed upon by Impax's proposed manufacture and sale
of riluzole.225
In the opinion, the Court promptly resolved the
evidentiary disputes raised by both parties before focusing on the
validity and enforceability of the patent.126 Additionally, both parties
asked the court to award the prevailing party attorney's fees; the Court
denied this request, finding that there was no evidence of bad faith on
either side in litigating this case.227
First, the Court examined the validity of the patent. 221 When a
patent is issued, it is presumed to be valid.229 Impax, to prove the patent
invalid, had to show either it was anticipated or obvious by clear and
220

Brown, 886 So. 2d at 523.
522.
222 Id. at 523.
221Id.at

224

Id.
Id.

225

Impax Lab., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268 (D. Del.

223

2004). ALS is a fatal disease of the central nervous system more commonly known
as Lou Gehrig's disease. Id.

Id. at 269-283.
Id at 284.
228 Id. at 270.
226
227

229 Id.

at 271.
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•
230
convincing evidence.
A patent is anticipated when the subject matter
previously existed, and can be found in prior references, and when it is
recognized "by persons of ordinary skill in the field of the
invention., 231
Impax presented three other patents to prove
anticipation, but the Court felt none of them addressed riluzole's
effectiveness in treating ALS and, therefore, they did not anticipate the
patent at issue. 32 The Court moved onto the question of obviousness.233
Multiple factors determine whether a patent is invalid as obvious,
including scope, content, and skill level of prior art, the differences
between the patent and prior art, and industry acceptance of patent as
valid.3 Impax introduced the patents mentioned above, articles and
testimony, to prove the patent was obvious, all of which the Court
dismissed for failure to prove obviousness by clear and convincing
evidence.235 The Court also dismissed Impax's final argument for the
patent's invalidity, that the patent named incorrect inventors, as
speculative and without evidence.2 3 ' Therefore, the patent was found to
be valid.237
The Court moved onto the second issue, that of enforceability.238
A patent is unenforceable when a party establishes, by clear and
convincing evidence, that inequitable conduct, including bad faith and
dishonesty, occurred when filing a claim for a patent.2 39 The parties
here disputed the material standard the Court should have used to
examine the patent, arguing for either an equitable principle standard or
using Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) rules. Federal Circuit Courts
have not ruled as to which standard should be applied but this Court
held Impax's claim of inequitable conduct would fail under either
standard.24 ° Impax presented two articles, test data, a letter from the
FDA, an editorial critical of the Aventis's Test results for riluzole, and
information concerning the acceptance of a theory on which the patent
was based.241 Impax claimed Aventis' deliberately withheld this
information with the intent of misleading the PTO.242 However, the

230Impax, 333

F. Supp. 2d at 271.

231 Id.

232

Id.at 271-73.

233Id. at

274.

234 Id

235 Impax, 333

F. Supp. 2d at 276.

236 id.
237

Id.at 284.

238

Id. at 277.

239 Id.
240

241

Impax, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 277.
Id. at 277-283.

242
Id.at

282.
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Court felt none of this evidence proved, by clear and convincing
evidence, Aventis's intent to deceive the PTO, thus there was no
inequitable conduct and the patent is enforceable. 4 3
Impax had filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application with the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, seeking approval to manufacture
and distribute riluzole for the treatment of ALS. 244 Aventis's patent was
found to be valid and enforceable.245 Therefore, Impax's intent to
manufacture and sell riluzole infringed upon their patent and was not
246
allowed:. Impax Lab., Inc. v. A ventis Phann., Inc., 333 F Supp 2d.
265 (D. Del.2004).
REFUSAL OF TREATMENT
14th Amendment Protects Inmate's Right to Refuse Treatment
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
hearing cross-motions for summary judgment, granted defendant, statecontracted physician's (hereinafter physician) motion for summary
judgment and denied plaintiff, inmate's motion for summary judgment
on the inmate's Section 1983 claim that the physician's deliberate
indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs caused an
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in violation of his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 4 7 The
court also denied both the physician's and the inmate's motions for
summary judgment on the inmate's Section 1983 claim that the
physician violated his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
rights by violating his liberty interest in freedom from unwanted
medical treatment and the inmate's claim of battery against the
physician. 4 ' Finally, the court ruled that the physician could not be
granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.249
The inmate, with a history of urological problems, initially saw
the physician for continued treatment of his kidney stones and for
removal of a ureteral stent (stent 1) because it had become infected.250

Id.at 282, 284.
Id.at 268-69.
245 Impax, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 284.
246 Id.at 284.
247Brown v. Ionescu, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18873 at * 14 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
241Id.at *17-*20.
249 Id.at *19-*22.
210 Id. at *3-*4. "The Oxford English Dictionary defines "ureter" as "either of
the fibro-muscular tubes or vessels which convey the urine from the pelvis of the
243
244
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The physician removed stent 1 and implanted a new stent (stent 2).2 ,
Later, the inmate, complaining of more pain and obstruction, was
diagnosed with another kidney stone and was informed that surgery
was necessary to remove the stone, remove stent 2 because it had

become infected, and implant another ureteral stent (stent

3).252

The

inmate alleged that he informed the physician that he would not
undergo surgery if a new stent was implanted and that he received
assurances from the physician that no stent would be implanted during
the surgery.253 However, after discovering stent 3 was implanted during
the surgery, the inmate filed Section 1983 actions against the statecontracted physician for violation of his Constitutional rights, and
before the court were both the inmate's and physician's motions for
summary judgment. 4
In order for the inmate to sustain a claim for deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs, the court explained, the inmate
must allege facts sufficient to satisfy an objective component, a serious
medical condition, and a subjective component, deliberate
indifference.2 " The physician did not dispute the inmate's condition
would likely satisfy the objective requirement, however, the court
explained, the inmate failed to assert that the physician disregarded his
condition in order to satisfy the subjective requirement. 5 6 However,
since the inmate alleged the physician implanted stent 3 despite the
inmate's refusal, the court concluded that the inmate's claim
constituted a Fourteenth Amendment claim for violation of his right to
refuse unwanted medical treatment.1 7 Thus, the court denied the
inmate's motion for summary judgment and granted the physician's
motion for summary judgment as to the inmate's Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim.258
The court explained that although the inmate's right to be free
from unwanted treatment is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,
there are instances where the state's interest in providing a safe and
secure environment outweighed the inmate's liberty interests, not to
mention the state also has a constitutional duty to provide adequate
kidney to the bladder, a urinary duct"). Id. at *2. A ureteral stent eases the removal
of kidney stones. Id.at *5-*6.
2' Id.at *4-*5.
252Ionescu, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18873 at *4-*5.
253Id.at *5.
254 Id. at *5-*6.
255
1 d.at *11-*12.
6
5 Id at *12-*13.
257 Ionescu, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18873 at *13.
258 Id. at *14.
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medical treatment.
Since neither party produced evidence as to
whether the inmate refused stent 3 or whether or not stent 3 was urgent
or necessary in favor of the state's interests, the court concluded
material facts were in dispute and denied both parties motion for
summary judgment.26
In addition, the court concluded that the
inmate's complaint outlined a cause of action for battery because a
battery can occur when a physician operates in spite of not being
authorized by the patient to do so.26 1 Thus, the inmate's claim
depended on of whether or not the inmate refused to consent to the
implantation of stent 3, which would have made
••
262 the physician's
undisputed implantation of stent 3 unauthorized.
Because the
inmate's consent was a disputed material fact, the court denied S•both
2 63
party's motions for summary judgment as to the inmate's state claim.
The court also denied the physician's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that he had qualified imunity.2 6 Qualified
immunity does not apply if the state actor's actions are clear violations
of statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have
known were being violated. 265 The court reasoned that the right to
refuse unwanted medical treatment had been long established, a
reflection of medical ethics, and, assuming the inmate's allegations
were true, simply not reasonable for the physician to believe he was not
violating the inmate's rights. 266 Brown v. Ionescu, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18873 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
Right of Privacy Recognized In Indiana's Constitution:
Constitutionality of Mandated Disclosure and Waiting Period In
Statute Regulating Abortion In Question
The Court of Appeals of Indiana ruled that the Indiana State
Constitution supports and protects a right of privacy for all Indiana
citizens, including women seeking to obtain an abortion, and thus
reversed and reinstated the Marion Superior Court's (hereinafter trial
court) dismissal of a complaint filed by the Clinic for Women
259Id.at
26 Id.at
261Id.at
262

*16-*17.
*18.

Ionescu, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18873 at *18-* 19.

263Id.at
26 Id.at
265
266

*14-*16.

* 19.
*22.

Id.at *19-*21.
d at *20-*22.
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(hereinafter Clinic) alleging Indiana's statutory informed consent
requirements for women seeking to obtain abortions (hereinafter
informed consent statute) violated Indiana's State Constitution.267
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals ruled that the free speech
protections of the Indiana State Constitution extends to the right to
refrain from speaking but that informed consent statute at issue did not
268
unconstitutionally infringe on these rights."
The informed consent statute required both mandatory inperson counseling, where the abortion provider is required to orally
convey information specified in the statute, as well as an eighteen-hour
waiting period before obtaining an abortion. 269 The Clinic, an abortion
provider, sought an injunction against enforcement of the statute on the
grounds that it violated the Indiana Constitution. 2 0 The trial court
granted the State's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the
Clinic appealed.27'
The Clinic argued that the informed consent statute's dual
requirements, which essentially force a woman to make two trips to the
abortion provider, effectively prevented women who live in rural areas
of Indiana from obtaining abortions because of the distance they must
travel to gain access.272 Although not specifically mentioned in the text
of Article 1, Section 1 of Indiana's State Constitution, the Court of
Appeals found the right of privacy therein based on its importance to
other rights guaranteed by the Indiana State Constitution and the
implicit assumption that it existed therein through judicial
interpretation and by legislative action. 273 In addition, the Court of
Appeals ruled that such right of privacy extended to the right of Indiana
citizens to make decisions about the health and integrity of their minds
and bodies, including the decision to terminate pregnancy, and that,
based on the history of the Indiana State Constitution, such a right is a
core value of the Indiana State
Constitution such that a legislature
274
mustn't "materially burden" it.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court erred in its ruling
that, as a matter of law, the informed consent statute did not
"materially burden" a women's access to an abortion which is
equivalent to "materially burdening" the core constitutional value of
267

Clinic for Women, Inc. v. Brizzi, 814 N.E.2d 1042, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

268 Id.
269

Id. at 1045.

270

Id at 1046.

271 Id

272Clinic for Women,

Id. at 1047-1049.
274Id. at 1048-1051.
273

814 N.E.2d at 1046.
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privacy underlying their right to obtain an abortion."' Thus, the Court
of Appeals concluded, the Clinic should be allowed to present evidence
on the nature and severity of the burden imposed by the statute's dual
requirements.
The Clinic also alleged that the informed consent statute
violated the Indiana's Constitution's freedom of speech provision by
compelling speech because the Indiana legislature lacked authority to
force it to do so without showing that the compelled speech is
necessary to avoid abuse and that such compulsion "materially
burdens" the core constitutional value of political/ideological speech.277
The Court of Appeals ruled, on an issue of first impression, that
Indiana's Constitution not only protects the prevention of speech but its
compulsion as well, following both the extension of the U.S.
Constitution to protect the same but also the more expansive
interpretations given to Indiana's free speech protections.
Addressing
the Clinic's arguments, the Court of Appeals ruled that the State had no
affirmative burden of proving an enacted statute was necessary to
prevent an abuse, instead, it is presumed constitutional unless proven
otherwise by a challenger. 27 9 The Court of Appeals also ruled that the
content of the mandatory disclosure was not political speech and
declined to expand the definition to ideological speech. ° Instead, the
Court of Appeals upheld the mandated disclosure as a valid exercise of
the State's Police Power.
Clinic for Women, Inc. v. Brizzi, 814
N.E.2d 1042, 1044 (Ind.Ct. App. 2004).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Complaint Dismissed For Lack of Diligence of Service When
Defendants Were Served Five Months After Complaint Was Filed
The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division affirmed
the Illinois Circuit Court's decision to dismiss a medical malpractice
complaint with prejudice because of failure to exercise reasonable
diligence to obtain service.2 2 The requirement to file an Illinois Code
of Civil Procedure Section 2-622 report affidavit does not affect
275Id. at
276

1051-1053.

Id.

277 Clinic for

Women, 814 N.E.2d at 1054-1055.
at 1053-1054.
...
Id. at 1054-1055.
278Id.

280Id. at

1055-1057.

281Id at 1056-1058.
282Lewis v. Dillon, 352

Ill. App. 3d 512, 520 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
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plaintiff deceased estate's burden to exercise reasonable diligence in
serving all Hospital and medical personnel defendants. 283 The court
affirmed Defendants Motion for Dismissal for Lack of Diligence and
Plaintiffs ("Lewis") failure to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain
service during the five-month period between the filing of the
complaint and the issuance of summons.24
Lewis brought a medical malpractice action against the
University of Chicago Hospitals and medical personnel who treated his
deceased wife, who died December 27, 1999.285
The medical
malpractice complaint was filed on December 21, 2001, shortly before
the two-year' statute of limitations period had run..
Because Lewis
was unable to file a mandatory health practitioner's report (Section 2622) within the two year statute of limitations, he filed an affidavit to
permit a 90-day extension to file the report.211 On March 18, 2002,
Lewis filed the practitioner's report. 88 On May 16, 2002, five months
after the filing of the complaint and after the statute of limitations had
run, Lewis issued his first summons on one of the defendants. 289 The
earliest service was effected May 31, 2002.290 Following service,
defendants filed motions to dismiss based Lewis's failure to exercise
reasonable diligence to obtain service. 291
The issue before the court was when a medical malpractice
complaint is a "viable" report.292 The Appellate Court of Illinois quoted
the trial court when it stated in part "once a complaint is signed by an
attorney and filed with the court, the affixation of counsel's signature
on the pleading constitutes a certification
by that attorney .... This is
293
sufficient to prosecute the lawsuit.
The court held that the requirement to file a section 2-622
affidavit for medical malpractice cases does not affect plaintiffs burden
to exercise reasonable diligence in serving all defendants.2 94
Lewis's proposed practice of "what they don't know won't hurt
them" would deny defendants the right to know that they have been
283Id

284Id.at

716-7.

Id.at 513.
286Id.at 514.
285

28

Lewis, 352 I11.
App. 3d at 520.

288 Id

289Id.at
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id.
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Id.at 514.
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Lewis, 352 Ill.
App. 3d at 514.
518-9.
294 Id.at 520.
293Id.at
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named in a lawsuit and the protection of Supreme Court Rule 103(b).295
Specifically, the Appellate Court noted that, "under plaintiffs
reasoning, a party would be permitted to file a lawsuit naming a
defendant, not issue summons to that defendant advising him or her if
the claim, and then, at some later date, dismiss the defendant due to the
inability obtain a section 2-622 report.296 The Court affirmed the trial
court's judgment dismissing Lewis's complaint with prejudice, pursuant
to Rule 103(b). Lewis v. Dillon, 2004111. App. LEXIS 1060at *19 (11
App. 2004).
Two Year Statute of Limitations For Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress and Outrage
The Supreme Court of Kansas answered two certified questions of law
regarding the state's statute of limitations on a claim for outrage and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.297 The court held the statute
of limitations for a claim of outrage an intentional infliction of
emotional distress was two years, and therefore did not address whether
a one year limitation would apply retroactively or prospectively.29
Plaintiffs were three daughters of their deceased father. 299
Plaintiffs contended the defendant Mercy Health Center of Manhattan
had employees who obtained consent from Kunz for organ and tissue
donation for certain parts of their father's body.3 °° The hospital
harvested the deceased's eyes and bone marrow for monetary gain and
in an effort to comply with quotas.0 '
The hospital's employees
obtained consent for the donation on the basis that Kunz was the
common law wife of the deceased.3' 2 However, no such relationship
existed and the employees never asked the plaintiffs about the marital
status of their father.3 3
Plaintiffs sought damages under several claims including the
intentional infliction of emotional distress and outrage. °4 The hospital
claimed the state's statute of limitations barred the plaintiffs' claim for
295

2%

Id.
id.

297Hallam

v. Mercy Health Ctr. of Manhattan, Inc., 278 Kan. 339, 345 (Kan.
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intentional infliction of emotional distress and outrage.305
The
defendant referred to the state act which requires action for assault to
be limited to one year.3 °6 The defendant argued the nature of the charge
was similar to the intentional tort of common law assault and was
therefore subject to a one year statute of limitation.3 °7
The plaintiffs argued the applicable statute of limitation period
was two years from the time the action accrues, and therefore their
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not barred.3 °8
The plaintiff referred to the state act which required actions for injury
to the rights of another to be brought within two years.309
The court found the statute of limitations for outrage was two
years." ° The state courts have applied the limitation to a medical
practitioner's mishandling of a corpse at least since decisions made in
1937.31 The answer to the first certified question was that the statute of
limitations on a claim of outrage and intentional infliction of emotional
distress was two years.3 12 Therefore, the court held the second question
speculating on the application of a one year limitation was moot.3 3
Hallam v. Mercy Health Ctr. of Manhattan, Inc., 278 Kan. 339 (Kan.
2004).
TAXATION
Non-Profit Hospital's Child Care Center Must Satisfy "Reasonably
Necessary" Test In Order to Be Exempt From Property Tax
The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District Four, reversed the circuit
court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff, St. Joseph's
Hospital of Marshfield (Hospital), and remanded the case giving the
hospital the burden of showing the percentage of children in the center
that were children of clinic employees who directly or indirectly
provided diagnosis, treatment, or care to hospital patients.1

30

5 id.

3

Id. at 341.
3' Hallam,278 Kan. at 341.
308 Id.

at 340.

309 id
310

Id. at 345.

31

Id. at 344-5.

312

Hallam, 278 Kan. at 345-6.

313
314

Id. at 346.

Joseph's Hosp. of Marshfield, Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 2004 WI App 187
(Wis. Ct. App. 2004).
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In 1999, Hospital constructed a stand-alone building near some
Hospital and Marshfield Clinic ("Clinic") employee parking to house
its child care center.315 The child care center is available to both
Hospital employees and Clinic employees. 316 The Hospital employs a
private company, Bright Horizons, to operate the child care center.317
Five percent of the spaces in the child care center are reserved for the
318
children of Bright Horizon employees who work at the center."
The issue before the court was whether a non-profit hospital's
child care facility is exempt from property tax.319 The Court used the
"reasonably necessary" test to determine 'whether the property and its
use is a 'reasonable necessity to the efficient functioning of the hospital
as an organization' in order for a property tax exemption. 2 °
The Court noted similarity in a sister case where the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin held that a hospital-owned residence, located near
the hospital and occupied by the hospital's chaplain, qualified for an
property tax exemption. 2 ' The Court concluded that the benefit to the

Hospital is sufficient under the "reasonably necessary" test.322 The
Court reversed and remanded to the lower court to determine what
percentage of the children in the center are children of Clinic
employees who directly or indirectly provide diagnosis, treatment, or
care to Hospital patients. St. Joseph's Hospital of Marshleld, Inc., v.
City ofMarshfield, 2004 WIApp 187 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004).
WRONGFUL DEATH
Plaintiff Need Only Allege Contributing Cause, not Actual Cause,
in Negligence Action
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied a
physician's motion for partial summary judgment.
The court ruled
that genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the
physician's actions contributed to the cause of the patient's death and

"' Id. at *2.
316

Id at *2-3.

3'

Id. at *3.

318 i.

"9 Saint Joseph's, 2004 WI App at *5.

Id.at *8.
"' Id.at *13-14.
322Id.at *23.
320

...
Estate of Cox v. Davis, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18554, at *1 (D. Kan. 2004).
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that the standard for medical negligence was only a contributing cause,
not the actual cause, as suggested by the physician.324
After sustaining injuries in a motor-vehicle accident, the patient
arrived at an emergency room in Kansas, where the defendantphysician ordered X-rays of the patient's cervical, thoracic, and lumbar
spine.3 2 The X-rays allegedly revealed a fracture of the thoracic spine,
which the physician allegedly failed to diagnose.326 The physician
discharged the patient, but the patient returned the next day and was
diagnosed with a thoracic spine fracture, the complications of which
resulted in the patient's death.327
The physician moved for partial summary judgment, relying on
deposition testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness, who stated that
the physician failed to diagnose the fracture but did not technically
have a hand in the patient's death. 328 The court stated that a plaintiff
must show a causal nexus between the breach of the physician's duty
and the plaintiff's injury,3 29 and the deposition testimony was sufficient
to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial.33 ° Estate of Chester
Cox v. Davis, No. 03-2507-GTV(Kan. Sept. 14,2004).
Wrongful Death Action Against Nursing Home Not Barred by
Statute of Limitations When Alleged Negligence Was Revealed
Upon Death Investigation
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee at Knoxville vacated the trial
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs wrongful death action against the
defendant nursing home. 33' It ruled that the plaintiff's causes of action
were not barred under Tennessee's statute of limitations and remanded
the case for further proceedings. 33
The decedent was admitted into the defendant nursing home
facility for rehabilitation after surgery, with a history of hypertension,
diabetes, urinary tract infection.333 The decedent died four days later,
apparently as a result of "massive infection febrinopurlent pericarditis
324Id.

at *9.

Id.

'2
at
326 id.

*2.

327 Id
328

Cox, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18554, at *7.

Id. at *5.
330Id at *9.
329
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with cardiac constriction." Exactly one year after decedent's death, her
husband filed suit against the nursing home. The nursing home moved
to dismissed based on the tolling of the one-year statute of
limitations;134 the plaintiff responded that he believed the nursing home
was taking proper care of his wife and did not become aware of the
defendant's negligence until he reviewed her medical records.335

The court first considered whether the trial court erred in determining
that the statute of limitations necessitated granting the Defendant's
motion to dismiss. 33 6 The court noted that its jurisdiction observed a
one-year statute of limitations from the discovery of the injury.337

It

ruled that neither the decedent nor the plaintiff could have reasonably
discovered the injury until the decedent's death, if not later.'
It further
ruled that the defendant could not separate the wrongful death action
into different parts, each with a different statute of limitations.33 9

Having reversed the trial court's granting of the defendant's motion to
dismiss, the court did not reach the issue of whether the trial court erred
when it refused to grant Plaintiffs Rule 60 motion for relief.34° Puckett
v. Life Care of America, No. E2004-00803-COA-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 622, at *2(Tenn. App. Sept. 24, 2004).
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